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Primitive Humour  
 




This article examines the question ‘what is humour?’  
 In section 1, we set out default realist presuppositions about the question. In section 2, we 
characterize a broadly Moorean approach to answering the question.   
 In section 3, we introduce popular response-dependence assumptions about humour and 
express puzzlement about their popularity. In section 4, we present extant answers to our question: 
superiority theory; relief theory; play theory; laughter-dispositional theory; and incongruity theory. 
We find each wanting, subjecting incongruity theory, in particular, to sustained scrutiny, and offer 
a novel critique of the approach. In section 5, we introduce precedents for primitivism from 
metaphysics, epistemology and action theory.  In section 6, we present several primitivist theses 
about humour. 
 In section 7, we conclude with some remarks about the methodological role primitivist theses 
can play in adjudicating answers to our question.  
 
 
1  Default Humour Realism 
 
Our question is:  
 
(Q) What is humour?  
 
One presupposition of (Q) is that there is a subject matter about which it asks: that there is humour.  
A default humour realist thinks it true that something is humorous. There are semantic reasons for 
accepting this. The content of plausible judgements provides forceful evidence for it. There are, for 
example, simple subject-predicate truths of the form ‘a is humorous’, like,  
(1) Four Lions is humorous. 
Truths like (1) entail our realist’s first claim: 
(2) Something is humorous.  
There are other expressions which share application conditions with ‘is humorous’. Plausible 
examples include: ‘is funny’, ‘is amusing’ or ‘ist komisch’. These expressions express the same 
concept: HUMOUR.  
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 The (interpreted) predicate ‘is humorous’ and the concept HUMOUR are humour 
representations. One sort of realism, ‘ostrich’ nominalism, would hold that the explanation of the 
truth of (1) and (2) bottoms-out in the satisfaction of these representations (cf. Devitt 1980).  
However, the default explanation of (1), (2) and their logical relations ontologically commits to 
a non-representational entity - the property funniness - which is possessed or instantiated by all and 
only funny entities. Further, there are truths for which ‘humour’ takes subject position: 
(3) Humour is a value. 
(4) Humour resembles wit more than it resembles mass. 
Providing a semantic explanation for these truths and their inferential relations is difficult without 
committing to the property humour (cf. Armstrong 1980; Pap 1959).1   
 On this basis our realist accepts that there is a property humour which plays the role of semantic 
value for humour truths and inferences. The properties belonging to a system motivated and 
characterised in this way are not representational entities, but their intensions and interrelations 
mirror those of the concepts that stand for them. We mark this by prefixing ‘R-‘ to their designators. 
Our realist believes in R-humour and she thinks that it is the subject matter of one exemplary 
reading of (Q).  
If one interprets everyday humour judgements at face value, one finds a striking categorial 
diversity in the semantic values for their subjects and quantifier domains. It appears that among 
funny entities are:  
(i) concrete particulars (material objects, persons, mental states, events, actions, sentence-
tokens); 
(ii) abstract particulars (propositions, mathematical entities, (e.g. redundantly convoluted 
proofs));  
(iii) instantiable entities those particulars are of (especially property co-instantiations); 
(iv) cross-categorial complexes (states of affairs, facts, situations). 
Where she takes such a judgement to be true, our realist takes it to be true at face value and holds 
that entities of these categories satisfy HUMOUR and instantiate R-humour.   
 There are also squarely metaphysical reasons for positing a humour property. We appear to have 
experiential evidence for it. First, funniness appears to bestow distinctive causal powers on its 
instances. There are systematic causal connections between objects’ funniness and responsive 
mental states of humorous amusement and of humorous laughter. Further, humour’s effects are 
 
1 Sometimes it is claimed that humour is ‘a matter of degree’ (Sharpe 1987: 209; Roberts 2019: 53, 89ff). If this implies 
that humour imposes a metric our realist suspends judgment (cf. Wolff 2019). She accepts that is funnier than holds of 
some pairs, but she only commits to an ordering which is: (i) weak because she thinks it epistemically possible that 
some things are equally funny; (ii) partial because she thinks it epistemically possible that some pairs are 
incomparable by the relation. If humour is not a matter of degree, our realist’s claim that something is funny amounts 
to the claim that something is in the domain of the is funnier than relation. She expects that actual patterns of assent 
and dissent to applications of ‘is (not) funny’ reflect further implicit semantic restrictions and non-semantic norms of 




manifested, beyond the realm of individuals’ psychology, in social, economic and political 
phenomena.  
Our humour realist doubts that humour is a globally intrinsic property, that is, that intrinsic 
duplicates are always equally funny. Still, we appear able to project from a limited stock of examples 
of humour and recognize an extensive, perhaps indefinite, range of further cases. Further, nearly all 
of us intentionally intervene in the world so as to produce instances of humour, most of us doing so 
with a degree of success expected of attempts at bestowing a genuine feature on something. These 
two facts have their most elegant metaphysical explanation from the hypothesis that humorous 
objects share in a non-trivial similarity which guides our recognition of, and intervention in humour. 
We call any property which discharges metaphysical roles an ‘M-property’. and that playing 
humour’s metaphysical role ‘M-humour’. Some strands in humour literature appear to treat humour 
as both an M-property and an R-property. Humour is supposed causally active, but also investigated 
as if its nature were determined by its conceptual or semantic role. On the simplest interpretation 
of these strands an identity claim is implicitly assumed:  
 
(RMI) M-humour is identical to R-humour.  
 
We, along with our default realist, hesitate to accept (RMI). Without adopting heavyweight 
philosophical assumptions, it is unclear why the intensions of, and relations between, M-properties 
should coincide with those of properties semantically characterised (c.f. Bealer 1982: 9-11, ch.8; Lewis 
1983; Ichikawa and Jenkins 2017). If M-humour and R-humour are distinct, our realist believes in 
both and she thinks that M-properties also provide exemplary subject matter for (Q).    
 Our default realist also thinks that HUMOUR is a value-encoding concept and that instantiating 
humour bestows value on its instances. She thinks that funniness is like the properties of beauty, 
pleasure, friendship, ethical goodness, knowledge, practical or doxastic justification. Our realist 
merely likens humour value to these values. She is not committal on deeper general issues about 
value, whether, say, values are sui generis or fundamental features of the world, or if they supervene 
on, or derive from the world’s non-axiological profile. Further, beyond healthy desires for 
parsimonious explanation, our realist feels no pointed compulsion to reduce humour-value to any 
(combinations) of those values, nor to consequences for promoting them.  
 The motivations for default realism are defeasible. It might be argued that the patterns of assent 
and dissent for ‘is funny’ are too capricious to count as applying a genuine concept or property (cf. 
Pettit’s 1991 ‘U-ness’), or perhaps it would have queer normative implications that render it 
unsatisfied (cf. Mackie 1977). Maybe apparent humour ascriptions merely function as expressions 
of non-cognitive attitudes about their objects (cf. Ayer 1946). Error-theoretic and expressivist 
proposals about humour strike us as worthy of consideration, especially if supplemented by 
fictionalist hypotheses (cf. Joyce 2005; Lewis 2005). However, we follow the established humour 







The philosophical question ‘what is humour?’ is to be answered by a sort of theory called an analysis. 
There are potentially many projects that might fall under that rubric (cf. Beaney 2013). However, we 
think that the dominant strands of philosophical literature manifest the contours of a traditional 
Moorean analytic project (c f. Daly 2010: Ch. 2, Moore 1903, Soames 2003: Chs.1, 3). First, as with 
Moore’s approach, humour literature is largely trusting of common sense humour judgements. 
Second, like Moorean analysis, the humour literature typically trusts the grammatical forms of 
ordinary humour ascriptions to reflect their logical forms.2 This contrasts with approaches that take 
grammatical form to be misleading (Russell 1914: 33-53) or those which apply explication or 
regimentation in supplying philosophically favoured logical forms for ordinary sentences (Carnap 
1950: 7; Quine 1960: 159-160). We think that such ‘interpretive’ approaches to the logical form of 
humour judgements might present interesting perspectives on central topics in humour inquiry, 
but we stick to the simple view.   
 Formally, a Moorean analysis attempts to supply the right-hand side for a true universally 
quantified biconditional of logical form (A):  
(A) (∀x) (funny (x)  ↔  ___(x))  
The left-hand side is said to be the analysandum, the right-hand side its analysans, where both may 
be terms or concepts (c.f. Daly 2010: 45). There are further requirements on such an analysis. First, 
the biconditional is to hold of metaphysical necessity. The right-hand side provides modally 
necessary and sufficient conditions on the application of the left-hand side’s term or concept.   
 Second, such an analysis imposes an asymmetry lacking from the truth-functional connective of 
propositional logic. The analysans should be informative about or explanatory of the analysandum, 
where these notions imply a distinguished direction. Traditionally, the asymmetry requirement is 
enforced by the demand that analyses be non-circular, where this is glossed, roughly, as the 
requirement that the term expressing the analysandum does not recur in the analysans.3 The 
complex representational entity, FUNNY, for example is to be decomposed into simpler, 
explanatorily prior constituents. Since R-funny’s substructure mirrors the structure of FUNNY’s 
application conditions, the approach can draw out the sub-properties which explain R-humour.  
 With M-humour, the legitimacy of the approach is unclear. Attention to relations of explanatory 
priority foregrounds an implausibility in the (RMI) thesis. It’s not merely that we might expect 
differing intensions for R-humour and M-humour. Rather, it may be that the explanatory ordering 
relations induced by a correct decomposition of HUMOUR diverge from the metaphysical 
explanatory ordering induced on M-humour by the world’s metaphysical structure (cf. Ichikawa 
and Jenkins 2017: 118-124). This seems obvious with R-mass (corresponding to MASS) and M-mass 
and it’s unclear why R-humour and M-humour should be different. For ease of exegesis, we leave 
(RMI) in place, but touch on these concerns in the remainder of the chapter.   
 
2 Though we doubt that many would follow Moore (1936) in holding that ‘exists’ functions as a first-order logical 
predicate.  
3 We say ‘roughly’ acknowledging legitimate non-circular ‘ostensive’ definitions in which term meanings are analyzed 
by appeal to the extensions denoted by the (orthographically) same term (cf. Levinson 1990: 15 and 2006: 396; section 
3.4 of this chapter) Further, some connective analyses are non-viciously circular analyses. They are informative but 




 The Moorean approach to testing such analyses involves armchair consideration of actual and 
hypothetical cases. On this methodology, the source of evidence for and against putative analyses 
is information encoded in the analysandum and analysans, where this is available by reflection to 
competent term or concept users. Traditionally, the rationale for this approach appeals to the 
obtaining of analytic connections between the concepts, connections which are transparent to 
competent concept users (Moore 1903, ch. 1, Soames 2005: 46-47). On this view, the metaphysical 
modal facts sought by analysis have their source in conceptual truths, where these are available a 
priori and whose holding is transparent to competent concept possessors. Here, despite some 
concordance with introspective methods employed in the humour literature, there are overriding 
reasons to resist. First, there are forceful objections directed on the crucial transparency claim. It is 
plausible to think that a competent user of two terms expressing the same concept can fail to 
recognise the fact (cf. Rieber 1992, Soames 2003: 46-47).  
 Second, two interrelated strands of post-Moorean inquiry about reference and meaning wrought 
tectonic changes which problematize the traditional epistemology.  A semantic strand undermined 
the traditional idea that the meaning (so reference) of a term is determined by internal 
psychological facts about its competent users (cf. Kripke 1980, Putnam 1975, Burge 1982).  The 
conclusion drawn was an externalist one: facts about a term’s referents can play a role in 
determining its meaning (Baghramian and Jorgensen 2013: 606). A metasemantic strand was 
initiated in Wittgenstein’s (1953) private language argument (cf. Kripke 1982), Quine’s (1960: ch.2) 
argument from below and Putnam’s (1981) permutation argument. This strand indicated that extant 
metasemantic accounts – whether descriptivist, causal or interpretationist – could not exclude 
radical deviant semantic interpretations for our language and thought; they leave facts about 
reference (so meaning) radically indeterminate (cf. Williams 2007, 2019). One conclusion drawn 
here is that some notion of eligibility for reference must be introduced into metasemantic theory in 
order to distinguish correct from deviant interpretations (cf. Lewis 1983: 49-55, 1984).   
 One influential lesson is that the traditional introspective methodology for meaning or concept 
(R-property) analysis is unsuitable to its subject matter (cf. Williamson 2007: chs.1-2), and while the 
dust has not settled on how to move forward, one popular line on evaluating analytic proposals 
stresses not only closeness to matching up with users’ applicatory dispositions, but also to eligibility-
tracking abductive virtues – simplicity, strength, compatibility with plausible background 
hypotheses and fecundity (cf. Lewis 1983, 1984, McGee 2005, Sider 2001: xxi-xxii,  Williams 2005). 
We doubt that HUMOUR is legitimately excepted from such considerations and hold that 
introspective methods are to be combined with abductive ones in testing putative humour analyses.  
 
 
3: Humorous Amusement 
 
Our realist, naively desirous of an explanation of humour’s nature might be somewhat disappointed 
by contemporary literature. As Adrian Bardon points out, typical contemporary theories of humour 
amount to ‘descriptions of conditions under which humour may be experienced rather than 
attempts to explain humour’ (2005: 463). A rationale for the focus on humorous amusement is 




the humorous is so characterised in virtue of the human attitude or response to it: we 
call something “humorous” if it is apt to, or should, or deserves to amuse people, or 
some special sort of person. By “amusement” here…I am using the word in the 
narrower sense in which amusement is amusement at the humorous or comic or 
witty…(1987: 142).  
 
Since there are humour-irrelevant cases of amusement – in holidaying, puzzle solving and 
epistemological endeavours – Clark cannily restricts the notion to humorous amusement, a 
restriction motific in the literature (cf. Martin 1987: 173; Scruton 1987: 157 ). Recently, Noel Carroll 
echoes Clark’s claim embedding it in a vignette of humour-theoretic practice:  
 
humour […] is what comic amusement is properly directed towards […] one way to 
illuminate humour is to analyse what it takes to give rise to the […] state of comic 
amusement, and work backwards from there. Humour will then comprise those 
features of the objects of comic amusement that account for the provocation of that 
state (2014: 1, 4, 7-8; our emphasis in bold). 
 
Jerrold Levinson (2006: 390) offers this:  
 
Although [(Q)] has been here formulated in the objective mode, as concerned with 
what it is for something to be humorous, there is the perhaps prior question, in the 
subjective mode, of what it is for someone to find something humorous. But these are 
plausibly related roughly as follows: something is humorous iff it is found humorous by 
appropriate audiences under favourable conditions […] Humour, though patently a 
response-dependent phenomenon, seems to have at least as much objectivity as 
beauty or virtue. (2006: 390; our emphasis in bold.) 
 
We take these comments as indicative of a widely held hypothesis that humour facts are explained, 
in some way, by facts about states of humorous amusement. 4 We think that Levinson favours a 
dispositional rendering.  
 
(D) For all x, x is humorous iff x disposes (appropriate) subjects to humorous amusement (in 
appropriate conditions). 
 
The comments of Clark and Carroll, however, suggest some fitting attitude account on which to 
ascribe funniness to something is to affirm or endorse its fitting or meriting such states.  
 
 
4 We’re reading the comments as assuming (RMI and as expressing explanatory priority. Perhaps there are subtler 
interpretations distinguishing M-properties from R-properties or as involving connective analyses (see n. 3 above). We 
don’t think either would capture the spirit of extant humour literature, but we’d be enthused about efforts in either 
direction.   
7 
 
(F) For all x, x is humorous iff x merits or fits (typical) subjects’ states of humorous amusement. 
 
Widespread acceptance of hypotheses like (D) and (F) construe the funniness of face value 
humorous objects as a shadow of psychological states of humorous amusement and directs 
inquiries about humour, as Bardon observes, to their putative source: the mental state of humorous 
amusement. 
 We do not reject any response-dependence hypothesis about humour, but they are peculiarly 
lacking in explicit motivation given their substantiality and extensive influence over humour 
inquiry.  
 There may be sources of motivation, however. One source of motivation might reside in a desire 
for secure epistemological foundations for humour judgements. This is implausible for merit 
accounts, since it is a supposed boon that they support the possibility of widespread error. Still, 
dispositionalists might propose that we have special, incorrigible access to the facts about our states 
of amusement that we lack for facts about the humorousness of their objects and that this makes 
the mental states a more reliable source of evidence (cf. Williamson 2000: 93). We fear that such a 
motivation might simply reflect a desire to adopt an introspective internalist approach, but we find 
it unconvincing on its own merits.  
 First, subjects frequently have better epistemological access to their environment than to their 
own psychology and we do not see why humour should be an exception (Williamson 2007: 5). 
Second, dispositional accounts appeal to subject and condition propriety. Yet it’s unclear that a 
subject’s epistemological access to such facts is generally more secure than her access to the facts 
about cases of humour. 
 Third, accepting, as we do, that our responses are generally reliable seems an adequate 
epistemological basis for humour inquiry and is a weaker, more probable claim than are substantial 
philosophical response-dependence theses.   
 Finally, there is just no obvious reason to think that encoding special epistemic security for our 
judgements is a desideratum on analytic theses about humour.     
 There might also be metaphysical motivations. When Levinson (2006: 389) proposes that cases 
of humour are ‘joined by the common production of [humorous] amusement’, rather than by their 
humour simpliciter, we wonder if his comment reflects puzzlement about how categorially diverse 
instances of humour could have anything in common beyond their status as intentional objects of  
states of humorous amusement - states more uniform than the face-value referents.  
 We think this line’s appeal to qualitative uniformity is, ultimately, an appeal to ideological 
simplicity and have concerns that its apparent benefits are illusory. We suspect that the merited 
response account is adopting its central notions as primitive one. And we fear that adequate 
dispositionalist theories will have to posit multigrade relations  (or ideal observers) in order to unify 
the phenomena.  
 Unifying categorially diverse objects by their relations to intentional states is not the only option. 
Fundamental concepts in logic, set-theory, mereology, mathematics, metaphysics and natural 
science unify objects and phenomena of extraordinarily diverse kinds. Yet on any sober 
understanding of intentional states - on which their invocation might be explanatory– such 
unificatory resources are not sufficiently powerful for the facts about the subject matter. Instead, 
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the fundamental concepts (or properties) are taken as primitives in their domains. (Though, they 
may be derivative given the concepts of another.)  
 Bracketing question-begging appeals to response-dependence, implausibly restrictive mind-
dependence theses, or far-out hypotheses about intentional states, we think it is a live option to say 
something similar about humour. The facts about humour might outrun unification by appeal to 
relations to intentional states. And for humour inquiry, we think that HUMOUR is a promising 
primitive (see sections 5 and 6).     
 Finally, there might be axiological motivations. Historically, there’s been a cloud of philosophical 
scepticism associated with humour value, a scepticism sometimes implicated in the philosophical 
neglect of humour inquiry (see Morreall 2009: ch. 5; O’Shiel: this volume). Response-dependence 
theses might be thought to provide a convenient way of neutralizing such scepticism. On the one 
hand, to experience humorous amusement is typically pleasurable and experiences of pleasure are 
intrinsically valuable (cf. Moore 1903). Perhaps humour’s value is instrumental in bringing about 
valuable experiences (cf. Sharpe 2000). On the other, once tied into psychology, humour is well-
positioned to produce valuable consequences of ethical, epistemological, cognitive, evolutionary, 
and social sorts. (cf.  Carroll 2014: ch.3; Morreall 2009: ch.6). However, we think it would be 
disingenuous to accept response-dependence to motivate instrumentalist or consequentialist 
responses to humour value scepticism. First, such approaches face serious pressure in their 
traditionally favoured domains of application: theories of artistic and aesthetic value and their 
legitimate foils ought not be eliminated by analytic fiat (see Sharpe 2000; cf. Shelley and Watkins 
2012). Second, while we accept that philosophical humour inquiry is sorely neglected, we don’t think 
advocacy of humour value scepticism is responsible. It’s implausible to think that humour value 
scepticism is a delivery of common sense and we think that any serious philosophical doubts about 
humour value flows from doubts about value in general, doubts that apply to better attended 
inquiries. The crucial concern, however, would be pragmatic or methodological. Building responses 
to scepticism into one’s conceptual or metaphysical theories of humour is bad news. It is no more 
fruitful for humour inquiry than it is for aesthetics, ethics or the philosophy of mind. It’s a 
concession that hobbles the successful development of theories that would answer serious 
questions about the distinctive nature of humour value and, perhaps, stimulate philosophical 
interest.    
 All of the major theories of humour we consider in the next section conform to Bardon’s 
observation -they are chiefly directed upon elucidating states of humorous amusement.   
 
 
4 Extant Accounts 
 
Superiority, Relief and Play theories are often rendered as answering (Q) by giving a traditional 
analysis of the R-property of humorous amusement supplemented by response-dependence theses 
about humour. We agree with Levinson in thinking that advocates of those views are, typically, 
more concerned with the ‘mechanisms of the humorous reaction than with its conceptual core’ 
(2006: 393). We think that the projects are better interpreted as causal or metaphysical 
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investigations into M-properties5, chiefly M-humorous amusement and, perhaps, also M-humour.6 
We think they fail as accounts of R-humour or M-humour.  
 
4.1 Superiority Theory  
 
In what is preserved of ancient and medieval writings on laughter, the behaviour is typically 
presented as an expression of malice toward its object, and the discursive tone is a cautionary one 
(Morreall 1982: ch. 2 and 2009: ch. 1; Lintott 2016). This tendency profoundly influenced modern era 
theorizing (Morreall 1982: 5, Carroll 2014: 345). In an oft-quoted passage Thomas Hobbes claims, ‘the 
passion of laughter [humorous amusement] is nothing else but a sudden glory arising from sudden 
conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmities of others, or with 
our own formerly’ (1839: IX, 13). Hobbes’s  ‘is nothing else but’ has been interpreted as a connective 
of conceptual analysis, thus presenting the obtaining of a state in which a subject considers herself 
superior to another or her former self as necessary and sufficient for humorous amusement.    
 Responding to this interpretation, Francis Hutcheson provided many counterexamples of 
diverse kinds to the sufficiency of the analysans. He argues, for example, that seeing the 
impoverished when we are financially comfortable, or creatures ‘in pain when we are at ease’ will 
not elicit amusement and we will more likely feel pity or weep (1987: 29). Against the necessity of 
the condition there are witty observations, puns, absurd poetry and instances of absurd visual 
humour for which the superiority condition appears unsatisfied (cf. Carroll 2014: 11-14).     
 If genuine, these counterexamples indicate that the superiority analysans do not even agree with 
the actual extension of humour, let alone provide adequate modally necessary and sufficient 
conditions. 
 Recently, Sheila Lintott has presented textual evidence that in addition to superiority, Hobbes 
saw staleness of stimulus as inhibiting the passion of laughter and that he saw a role for novelty and 
unexpectedness in humour, features cited in popular modern-day incongruity theories (Hobbes 
1839: IX, 13; Lintott 2016: 353-354). Further, Lintott notes that Hobbes’s ‘analysans’ are more plausibly 
interpreted as being of a causal-psychological stripe reflecting his causal-regressive approach to 
analysis (Hobbes 1655; Levinson 2006: 393; Lintott 2016: 355).  
 Even qualified thus, where staleness is not at issue, the abundance and diversity of clear actual 
dissociation between cases of humorous amusement and cases of considered superiority leave even 
the most minimally interesting causal or metaphysical reading dubious.7   
 
 
4.2 Relief Theories  
 
 
5 Perhaps our humour representations should be ‘engineered’ to better reflect M-properties’ intensions (cf. Cappelen 
2018).  
6 Whether the connecting claim is best interpreted as conceptual or causal/metaphysical is unclear. We think they fail 
as accounts of humorous amusement.    
7 Tentatively, we suggest that superiority phenomena associated with humorous amusement may be as accidental to 
that state as are superiority phenomena sometimes co-occurring with other value-registering states in moral 
grandstanding, intellectual (epistemological) pomposity or aesthetic snobbery.  
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Relief theories are offered by Herbert Spencer (1911) and Sigmund Freud (1928) who attempt to 
explain humorous amusement by the ontology and ideology – the objects, concepts and doctrine 
(Quine 1951; Sider 2011: 12-15) – of late-modern era psychological theory. 8  
 The focal claim is that each event of humorous laughter is a discharge of stored excess nervous 
energy. This claim may be worked back into an analysis of face-value humour ascriptions: the 
humorous is that which generates and releases the nervous energy discharged by humorous 
laughter. Here it is clear that the claim is not one of analysis in our sense. The theory is akin to 
‘lightning is electrical discharge’, a claim not taken to imply the truth of ‘electrical discharge is 
lightning’. The logical form of such claims is better represented as a universally quantified 
conditional ((∀x) (Fx ↄ Gx)) than by the biconditional forms sought in analysis.  
 For this reason, counterexamples to sufficiency seem beside the point. That said, the relief theory 
does identify each event of humorous laughter with an event of stored nervous energy discharge. In 
response, patient arguments have been offered which conclude that relief theory can provide only 
strained and ad hoc explanations of humorous laughter and amusement at immediately graspable 
comedic scenes and daft poetry (Carroll 2014: 40; Morreall 2009: 20).  
 Our pointed concern is that any prima facie faith in the epistemic credentials of an attempt to 
assimilate humour phenomena into the ontology and ideology of a scientific theory evaporates 
when the theory is no longer considered live in active scientific inquiry. The latter holds of 
Spencerian and Freudian psychology and, in part, this is because of ad hocism concerns beyond its 
treatment of humour.9 The unchecked positing of ad hoc hypotheses is a key source of scientific 
dissatisfaction with the methodology of that psychological practice (c.f. Popper 1959; Lakatos 1978). 
Further, philosophical theories are also beholden to abductive evaluation (see section 2 above). 
And, since ad hoc hypotheses are abductively viceful (cf. Daly 2010: 135), even if patched-up to match 
our intuitions about humorous amusement, the ad hoc explanatory practices noted by Carroll and 
Morreall and scientific detractors would warrant suspicion about the explanatoriness of the result.   
 Relief theories do manifest two interesting turns of thought. One is an explicit attempt to 
assimilate humour phenomena into some scientific theory. Second, there is a subtle emphasis on 
an ontology of temporally extended events and processes, rather than persons or states, as canonical 
bearers of humorous amusement.   
 
 
4.3 Play Theories  
 
Contemporary play theories are given pre-modern philosophical precedent in remarks due to 
Aristotle (1987: 14) and Thomas Aquinas (1972) on humour’s role in activities of playful relaxation. 
Like relief theories, play theories emphasize temporally extended entities - activities of play - as their 
canonical objects. They also seek to illuminate these humour activities by appeal to the special 
sciences. However, they aim to adopt the concept resources of live special sciences, including 
evolutionary psychology, ethology and anthropology (see e.g. Morreall 2009: 33-40).   
 
8 Thanks to Daniel O’Shiel for steering us away from some exegetical inaccuracies here.  
9 See O’Shiel (this volume) for a take on relief theories influenced by philosophical anthropology.  
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 There is little reason to think that such theories give an analysis of what a humorous activity is. 
There are non-humorous forms of play - in games, sports and the arts - which promote their own 
non-humorous forms of amusement. Worse, there appear to be humorous kinds of activities whose 
status as play seems doubtful – those involved in satire, critique and marketing for example (see 
Carroll 2014: 42-43).   
 However, in parallel with relief theories, one suspects that the aim is to identify each humour 
activity with an activity of play of some form. Still, even this leaves doubt about whether the subject 
matter pertinent to (Q) is preserved. Play theories might explain humour activities or practices, but 
there is no obvious way of working back from such an account to an account of the mental state of 
humorous amusement, or of humour itself.10  
 The next two theories we consider are intended as squarely analytic in a traditional sense and 
we give them more thorough examination.    
 
 
4.4 Levinson’s Laughter-Dispositional Analysis  
 
Jerrold Levinson’s laughter-dispositional analysis of humorous amusement is conceptual-analytic 
in aim. However, Levinson does not attempt to specify the distinctive nature of states of humorous 
amusement - the features that distinguish it from, for example, non-humorous forms of amusement 
involved in games, puzzles and epistemological endeavours - by appeal to its internal nature.  
 We think that Levinson adopts a Canberra Plan approach to humorous amusement (cf. Jackson 
1998, Lewis 1997). On this approach one specifies the (primary) conceptual content for HUMOROUS 
AMUSEMENT by assembling role-determining platitudes concerning it. One may then discern its 
(secondary) content by empirical investigation into what realises the role.    
The result of his investigation is this:  
 
[a]n item x is humorous or funny iff x has the disposition to elicit, through mere 
cognition of it, and not for ulterior reasons, a certain kind of pleasurable reaction in 
appropriate - that is, informationally, attitudinally and emotionally prepared - subjects 
generally, where this pleasurable reaction, amusement, is identified by its own 
disposition to induce, at moderate or higher degrees, a further phenomenon, namely, 
laughter. By these lights, the funny cannot be detached from all felt inclination […] 
toward […] laughing’ (Levinson 2006: 396). 
 
Levinson’s presentation is extremely dense, incorporating his response-dependence thesis within 
the specification of humorous amusement’s cognitive role. Interpretative problems are engendered. 
The presentation might seem to give the inclination toward laughter an incredible role. Levinson 
explicitly heads off one such reading: 
 
 
10 Here we think that objections to Moritz Weitz’s (1956) anti-essentialist view about ART which point toward its 
equivocation between art-as-practice and art-as-object and the lack of obvious connection between the two and to 
Dickie’s Institutional Theory of art are suggestive (cf. Gaut 2000; Abell 2012).  
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What of the idea that amusement is not amusement unless it both arises in a certain 
way and has a certain intentionality? The present analysis acknowledges this in its own 
fashion, for it entails that a reaction to x is not amusement unless, in addition to being 
pleasurable, and leading characteristically to laughter, it comes about in virtue of 
cognition of x, and is also directed on x (2006: 396).  
 
Here, Levinson offers the basis for a functional characterization - a gesture toward a conceptual 
role-specifying Ramsey or Carnap sentence for the state of humorous amusement about something 
(cf. Lewis 1970). This cites the subject’s directedness upon that thing, the nature of the pleasurable 
enjoyment of that thing, and the disposition toward laughter. 
 Unfortunately, the claim that the funny ‘cannot be detached’ from inclination toward laughter 
was not explicitly qualified, and it has been taken to suggest that Levinson’s analysis rules as 
metaphysically impossible cases of humorous amusement for any subjects lacking the inclination 
toward laughter (cf. Carroll 2003: 254 and 2014: 45-46). Levinson does not, however, intend that the 
‘cannot’ be read with such metaphysical force. According to him, ‘the mental state of amusement is 
largely identified by its disposition - universal, if ultimately contingent - to issue in laughter when 
sufficiently intense,’ (2006: 396; our italics). He later adds:  
 
[t]he connection of amusement and the felt inclination to laugh is more that of a 
phenomenon and a reference-fixer to that phenomenon. It is not essential to the affect 
of amusement that it actually dispose creatures to laughter. Rather amusement is 
identified, but not defined, as that pleasurable affect, which, in humans, normally 
disposes to laughter (2006: 397).  
 
More likely, Levinson’s comment, if not merely a methodological prescription, reflects an 
epistemological ‘necessity’ or a priority introduced by reference-fixing (cf. Kripke 1980: 54-57; Lewis 
1997: 353 n. 22).  
 However, on the one hand there appear to be extremely low-key sorts of humour (Carroll 2014: 
45). While these might be permitted as inciting laughter only at low levels, there is a worry that non-
humorous amusement - in solving a difficult crossword puzzle, or safely un-skewering a knight - 
also has such a propensity.  
 On the other hand, the empirical evidence suggests that humorous amusement’s connection to 
laughter is more capricious than one’s first-up intuitions might predict. As Robert Provine puts it: 
 
Laughter is an instinctive, contagious, stereotyped, unconsciously controlled, social play 
vocalisation that is unusual in solitary settings. Laughter punctuates speech and is not 
typically humour related.’ (2004: 217.)  
 
Carroll (2014: 48) too notes that most actual cases of laughter are ‘phatic’, playing the role of a social 
lubricant, rather than being humour directed. Indeed, on the face of it there appear to be cases 
which generate laughter and which also satisfy the internal architecture Levinson suggests - joyous 
laughter at the report of the marriage of two friends, for example (Carroll 2014: 48). Even as a 
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reference fixer rather than a necessary condition, the inclination toward laughter does not seem 
sufficiently discerning for states of humorous amusement.   
 We do not think such considerations are decisive against the functionalist orientation of 
Levinson’s analysis of humorous amusement. Levinson’s articulation of humorous amusement’s 
cognitive architecture might be supplemented and revised. Perhaps the empirical data merely 
suggests that Levinson’s appeals to laughter dispositions represents erroneous ‘first-up’, rather than 
reflective, intuitions about laughter, or that the interpretation content of HUMOROUS 
AMUSEMENT requires input beyond the sorts of intuitions statable by the folk   (cf. Lewis 1974; 
Williams 2019: ch.1). Nevertheless, although the correctness of some Canberra Plan-inspired option 
is more likely than Levinson’s own, the general proposal is evaluable only as a program and qua 
program there are pointed concerns about the epistemological connection between conceptual 
roles and their realizers lurking for any development (cf. Daly 2010: 77-78; Jackson: 1998: 24-27; 
Soames 2005: 152-164).   
 
 
4.5 Incongruity Theory 
 
In its most modest contemporary formulation, the incongruity account holds that if x is a state of 
humorous amusement then the object of x is a perceived incongruity. A focus on incongruity can 
be found in Aristotle (Rhetoric III, 2), Hutcheson (1750), Kant (1790), Beattie (1779), Schopenhauer 
(1818), Hazlitt (1819), Kierkegaard (1846), Monro (1951), Koestler (1964), Clark (1987), and Carroll 
(2005; 2014). Indeed, it is widely accepted as the leading account of humorous amusement today. 
However, despite its distinguished history, the view faces serious challenges on two fronts.  
Firstly, although there is good reason to take the necessity claim seriously, it seems false that x 
is a state of humorous amusement iff the object of x is a perceived incongruity. As Alexander Bain 
(1875:  282) observed: 
 
There are many incongruities that may produce anything but a laugh […] an instrument 
out of tune, a fly in ointment, snow in May […] 
 
This is the challenge of establishing sufficiency. Many perceived incongruities are insufficient for 
humorous amusement. 
Secondly, the term used to express the central concept is baggy and vague, and the account has 
limited informativeness. As Levinson (2006: 391) notes: 
 
Incongruity, or non‐fittingness of items or elements one to another, has been variously 
interpreted, and ranges from logical impossibility or paradoxicality, through absurdity and 
irrelevance, to unexpectedness and unaccustomedness, to general inappropriateness. 
 
The approach therefore faces the challenge of specification. Incongruity theorists must offer a 
plausible specification of the core concept(s) that can underpin an explanation of why we find 
some objects amusing and some unamusing. The current umbrella concept fails to do this. 
Clark (1987) triggered a modern wave of incongruity+ accounts (See Warren and McGraw 2021). 
Such accounts aim to supplement incongruity with further conditions tailored to exclude 
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unamusing cases of incongruity. Some of these accounts also aim to sharpen the core concept of 
incongruity (See Voltolini: this volume). 
Clark tentatively explores the hypothesis that x is a state of humorous amusement iff the object 
of x is a perceived incongruity and the subject undergoing x enjoys perceiving the object at least 
partly for its own sake. 
This additional enjoyment condition has been widely recognized since. For ease of reference, we 
will use *enjoyment.  
However, as Martin (1987: 176-77) observes, counterexamples can be found in our non-
humorous *enjoyment of artistic depictions such as the deformed figures in Guernica and 
dramatic irony in tragedies. Clark’s incongruity+ account therefore fails to offer a satisfactory 
analysis of humorous amusement. 
Carroll (2014) makes a powerful case for the necessity of incongruity and offers a diverse range 
of insightful examples. Interestingly, he emphasizes the role of norms in specifying incongruity, 
arguing that (2014: 17): 
 
what is key to comic amusement is some deviation from a presupposed norm – that is to 
say, an anomaly or an incongruity relative to some framework governing the ways in 
which we think the world is or should be. 
 
By construing norms in this liberal sense, Carroll’s account is well positioned to accommodate the 
full spectrum of humour types, as well as respecting the categorial diversity of its objects. This is 
not the case with other specifications such as expectation-violation or logical paradox. This norm-
driven approach also naturally enables us to understand the culturally variable aspect of humour 
(Cochrane 2017: 54). This partial specification therefore seems to be the most promising path 
towards a unification of the approach. Nonetheless, perceived norm-violation is little closer to 
providing a sufficient condition than the umbrella concept of incongruity. Consequently, Carroll 
sets out further conditions to preclude common counterexamples. He argues (2014: 49-50) that 
creatures like us are in a state of comic amusement if and only if: 
 
i) the object of one’s mental state is a perceived incongruity which ii) one regards as non-
threatening or otherwise anxiety producing and iii) not annoying and iv) towards which 
one does not enlist genuine problem-solving attitudes (v) but which gives rise to 
enjoyment of precisely the pertinent incongruity and vi) to an experience of levity. And 
humour then is the response-dependent object of comic amusement, characterised thus. 
 
As we will see, this account integrates some of the most widely explored supplementary 
conditions in the contemporary literature and provides an authentic flavour of the broader field.  
The restrictions on negative emotions offer a possible way of addressing certain aesthetic 
incongruities such as in Guernica, or with dramatic ironies in tragedies, as well as disturbing or 
unpleasant incongruities in daily life. 
As Carroll acknowledges, however, we might enjoy the incongruity of a puzzle that is neither 
disturbing nor annoying yet experience no humorous amusement. The fourth condition excludes 




In the state of comic amusement, on the other hand, we are not concerned to discover 
legitimate resolutions to incongruities, but at best, as in the case of jokes, to marvel at the 
appearance of sense, or the appearance of congruity, in what is otherwise recognized as 
palpable nonsense. 
 
By contrast, in legitimate problem-solving we take pleasure in making ‘genuine sense’ (ibid) of the 
incongruity. Carroll builds on this claim in formulating the sixth – affective – condition. He holds 
that when we realise that an incongruity requires no genuine resolution, we undergo a cognitive 
transition involving a sense of effortlessness and relaxation. Carroll describes this feeling as an 
experience of levity (2014: 49), suggesting that this is the most plausible way in which amusement 
may be said to involve relief. We can thereby see that this characterization of the affective 
component depends on the denial of genuine problem solving. We have doubts about these 
supplementary conditions, however. 
Firstly, there are counterexamples to sufficiency. For example: our non-humorous *enjoyment 
of an exotic food recipe, an unusual sunset, or a novel dancing style. It is not clear how the 
additional conditions rule out such common incongruities.  
Secondly, it is doubtful whether the supplementary conditions are necessary for humorous 
amusement. We will take them in turn, understanding each as an articulation of a wider theme in 
humour research. 
The second and third conditions exclude certain negative emotions. A restriction of some form 
on negative emotions commands broad support in the literature (Beattie 1779; Bergson 1913; 
Rothbart 1973, 1976; Apter 1982; Morreal 1987; Ramachandran 1998; Carroll 1999, 2005; Hartz and 
Hunt 1991; and Warren and McGraw 2016).  
However, evidence is strikingly thin on the ground for any strong claim here. Carroll’s fuller 
(1996) discussion nods to empirical evidence (Rothbart 1973, 1976). Rothbart presents evidence 
that in some cases the same stimuli can induce either laughter or fear depending on whether it is 
perceived as threatening or not. More recently, McGraw and Warren (2010) and McGraw et al 
(2012) have highlighted different ways in which psychological distance can affect the likelihood of 
amusement being reported. For instance, substantial norm violations are more likely to be 
reported as amusing if they occur within a fictional context, or if there is social distance between 
the individual and the target of the humour. 
We do not deny that there are cases in which negative emotions - in some sense – affect 
amusement. Yet we wish to make two observations. Firstly, it is not clear how these cases should 
be interpreted. Indeed, McGraw and Warren do not assert outright incompatibility. Rather, they 
suggest that the right degree of threat is conducive to humorous amusement (McGraw, Williams 
and Warren 2014). Moreover, the empirical evidence only concerns the statistical probability of 
report of amusement with many reported outlier cases that starkly undercut the proposal to build 
the exclusion of negative emotion into the definition of amusement.  
We can also see that there are various ways to understand the group of cases that do involve 
the apparent inhibition of amusement. It may be that in some scenarios the negative emotion 
merely masks rather than blocks the instantiation of the state of amusement by reducing the 
attentional resources dedicated to the state and lowering its accessibility for introspection and 
report (See Strick et al 2009 for evidence of attentional conflict in the reverse direction). More 
generally, mutual causal modification seems to be a more plausible explanation of a loose inverse 
statistical relationship than the unmotivated hypothesis that the two kinds of mental states 
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cannot, by necessity, co-occur. Indeed, given the apparent regularity with which conflicting 
emotional states co-occur in an individual, this would represent a quite remarkable finding. 
Secondly, whilst we are happy to grant the possibility of cases of blocking, there are also cases 
which, prima facie, appear to involve the coinstantiation of amusement and extremely strong 
negative emotion. Gallows humour regularly seems to involve the coinstantiation of amusement 
and the experience of profound personal harm. Individuals often express a blackly comic 
amusement at their own romantic disasters, personal character defects, failures in their careers, 
and, sometimes, even more grievous tragedies. Henman (2001) movingly describes the use of 
humour by prisoners of war as a coping mechanism, sometimes risking torture in order to make a 
joke. 
Similarly, it is arguably common to simultaneously experience annoyance and humorous 
amusement (contra iii) – at a partner that snores like a warthog, the winding trail of mess behind a 
housemate, or a reliably late friend. Indeed, humour is widely used as an emotion regulation 
strategy by individuals within healthy romantic relationships during conflict resolution (Horn et. 
Al. 2019). It seems implausible that there is no temporal overlap whatsoever of amusement and 
strong negative emotion during a gradual, emotionally complex regulatory process of this kind. 
Those who wish to exclude negative emotions in the very definition of what humorous 
amusement is owe us a serious argument for this astonishingly bold necessity claim.  
Carroll’s fourth condition denies that we adopt a genuine problem-solving attitude to the 
incongruities that amuse us. This again, reflects a strong current in contemporary discussion 
(Voltolini: this volume). Yet this claim seems false and is perhaps the by-product of a 
disproportionate focus on scripted punchline jokes in humour research (for a more general 
critique of this tendency see Provine 2000). On the face of it, many types of humorous amusement 
involve the genuine resolution of a puzzling incongruity. Example: a woman arrives home and her 
husband is behaving with an incongruous level of consideration – taking her coat, offering to cook 
dinner and listening attentively to her complaints about work. Amused yet puzzled, the woman 
slips away into the kitchen and discovers a bin bag containing the remains of her favourite vase. 
She laughs as she infers the reason for his strange behaviour: he has accidentally smashed the vase 
and fears her possible fury.  
In laughing instead, she is not simply amused at the fact that he has broken the vase or the fact 
that he is behaving considerately. Rather, she is amused at the fact that he is behaving 
considerately because he has broken the vase. That is, she is amused by the precise way that the 
evidence in the kitchen explains the incongruous behaviour. This represents a genuine insight 
through successful problem-solving.  
The sixth condition proposes the affective component of levity. However, given that the only 
characterization offered is in terms of a realization that the incongruity does not require a genuine 
resolution, humorous problem-solving cases also undermine the informativeness and appeal of 
the sixth condition. 
This kind of counterexample suggests an alternative direction for the incongruity+ approach 
however: an incongruity+resolution account. According to the strongest formulation of this view, 
x is a state of humorous amusement iff the object of x is a perceived resolution of an incongruity. 
Incongruity alone is not sufficient for amusement. We must also make sense of the incongruity in 
some respect, whether implicitly and automatically or otherwise. For instance, we might 
reinterpret a prior ambiguity in a way that resolves an apparent incongruity. Consider the 




‘Is the doctor home?’ the patient asked in his bronchial whisper. 
 
‘No’, the doctor’s young pretty wife whispered in reply. ‘Come right in.’ 
 
In this joke, the apparent incongruity of the wife’s invitation is immediately resolved by an 
instinctive reinterpretation of the ambiguous intent of the earlier question.  
Warren and McGraw (2016: 410) describe resolution as ‘[the] most frequently discussed 
supplementary condition’ and it has been explored in the work of Beattie (1779), Suls (1972, 1983), 
Schultz (1972), Pien and Rothbart (1976), Rothbart (1976), Minksy (1980), Paulos (1980) Raskin 
(1985), Attardo (1997), Ritchie (1999), Alden et al. (2000), Storey (2001), Woltman Elpers et al. 
(2004) and Kulka (2007).   
The approach has many attractive features and is highly intuitive in relation to scripted 
punchline jokes yet still faces substantial problems. Firstly, the term expressing the core concept 
of ‘resolution’ appears to be as vague as ‘incongruity’. This duplicates the traditional problem of 
specification. Secondly, various counterexamples have been offered involving nonsensical humour 
(Morreal 1987: 197-99; Carroll 1991: 288; Cochrane 2017: 57) where it is argued that resolution is not 
necessary for humorous amusement.  
We can better grasp the import of these problems by more carefully distinguishing some of the 
different ways in which we might understand resolution. Let us say that a state of amusement 
affords high resolution if it involves successful problem-solving and offers a genuine explanatory 
insight into reality (as in the case of the smashed vase). Let us also say that a state of amusement 
affords moderate resolution if it involves gaining understanding of a logically coherent fictional 
narrative (such as in the case of the doctor’s wife). Finally, let us say that a state of amusement 
affords low resolution if it involves gaining awareness of some aspect of the content as conforming 
to a norm governing the way that we think that something is or should be. These rough and ready 
distinctions are not exhaustive and warrant further refinement but they should serve our limited 
purposes here.  
Much surrealist or absurdist humour appears to lack both high and moderate resolution. We 
can see this in nonsense verse, a form of humorous poetry that is often logically incoherent or 
employs made-up words that lack clear meaning (See Lewis Carroll, Edward Lear, and Roald Dahl, 
for instance). Consider the following example: 
  
‘I see,’ said the blind man 
 ‘You’re a liar!’ said the deaf man 
 ‘I agree!’ said the mute. 
 
We gain no genuine explanatory insight from this verse and it is logically incoherent. Yet as with 
most cases of nonsense verse, the content conforms to a number of poetic norms – such as rhyme 
(see/agree), repetition, the rule of three, and alliteration (see/said). The verse therefore affords low 
resolution. It makes sense poetically. Furthermore, this conformity to poetic norms is intuitively as 
much part of the object of amusement as the incongruities asserted. This can be seen by 
substituting key words in a way that maintains semantic similarity but reduces conformity to the 
respective norms. This decreases amusement. 
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Other forms of surrealist humour lack even this minimal level of apparent narrative structure 
or quasi-explanation. Modern internet memes thrive on the seemingly inexplicable combination 
of well-known images or phrases, and the musical comedy of stand-up artists such as Bill Bailey 
often ‘mash up’ unexpected styles of music and other elements from popular culture without 
explanation. These again appear to lack high and moderate resolution, yet it seems more plausible 
to think that even surrealist humour of this kind will trade at least partially on conformity to 
certain norms in the precise way that these absurd juxtapositions are presented and fused. 
Memes, for instance, are highly formulaic despite their irreverence. Carroll (2014: 54) argues that 
‘pinpointing the perceived incongruity in a specimen of humour enables one to dissect it, at its 
joints’. It appears, though, that, in many cases, low resolution tracks amusement too. In the 
nonsense verse above, for example, we can pinpoint some aspects of what makes it amusing by 
attending to the distinctive norms that it conforms to. 
Critics of resolution are often inexplicit on the type of resolution being disputed but usually 
appear to be operating with a relatively demanding notion of resolution. See, for instance, 
Cochrane’s (2017: 57) focus on whether the overall scenario is physically likely. We take it that a 
minimal form of resolution is more likely to withstand counterexamples to necessity and therefore 
that a norm-based incongruity+low resolution account is the most credible direction for 
incongruity research given the wider motivations for taking the role of both norms and resolution 
seriously. We are not aware of any account articulated in these terms however Veatch’s (1998) 
multiple norms view seems broadly compatible with this approach and Kotzen (2015) grants a 
central role to norms though important details differ. 
The problem, nevertheless, is that the following biconditional seems obviously false: x is a state 
of humorous amusement iff the object of x is the perceived low resolution of a violated norm. 
Whilst low resolution may be necessary for amusement, apparent conformity to norms, liberally 
construed, is far too cheap and readily available. The account regularly predicts humorous 
amusement where there is none. This is the case even if we restrict ourselves to scenarios where 
we *enjoy the perceived low resolution of a violated norm. In fact, counterexamples can be found 
in each of the areas identified as problematic for Clarke (1987) and Carroll (2014): artworks, 
dramatic narratives, puzzles, exotic food, unusual natural scenes, and novel dance styles. For 
instance, in the case of drama we might partly *enjoy an unusual twist in a plot due to the way the 
story simultaneously makes sense of the twist through its apparent conformity to other norms 
relating to human behaviour. Yet we need not be humorously amused. 
We find ourselves in a familiar position then. The refined incongruity approach can offer a 
plausible pair of necessary conditions (violated norm + low resolution) but the pair is insufficient 
for humorous amusement and is still unable to explain why we find some objects amusing and 
some unamusing. The best option on the menu may carve humour at the joints - as Carroll noted 
of the more rudimentary incongruity package - but it also seems to carve everywhere else too. The 
challenge for incongruity theorists is to tell us exactly what it is about this norm structure that can 
explain when and why objects will be amusing. However, given the long history of these problems, 







We’ve given somewhat opinionated grounds for dissatisfaction with extant analyses, but if our 
grounds are without merit, we think that our dissatisfaction is in harmony with the tenor of the 
literature. For this reason, we are surprised at the dearth of humour primitivist proposals.  
 The starkest primitivist proposals are the absolute primitivisms found in fundamental 
metaphysics. Candidates for absolutely primitive concepts include: IDENTITY (Hawthorne 2006); 
INSTANTIATION (Armstrong 1978); PERFECTLY NATURAL PROPERTY (Lewis 1983); COMPOSES 
(Markosian 1998); QUANTIFICATION (Sider 2011) or ABSTRACT (Cowling 2017).  
 We doubt that absolute humour primitivism is plausible, but recent work in epistemology and 
action theory suggests ways of formulating weaker, relativised primitivist claims. In her work on 
actions, Lucy O’Brien (2017) usefully distinguishes two senses of ‘prime’ that might be predicated of 
a phenomenon (2017: 272):  
 
A phenomenon, X, is basic, for some group of phenomena  iff X is not factorizable or divisible into 
those phenomena (without remainder). Basicness is much like the primeness of prime numbers.  
 
A phenomenon, X, is primary relative to an explanatorily ordered group of phenomena, on 
condition that it is earlier in that ordering. Primacy is much like the primeness of a prime cut.11  
 
Williamson (2000) argues that knowledge is basic relative to epistemological and psychological 
phenomena. O’Brien (2017) argues that action is basic relative to ‘personal-level psychological 
phenomen[a]’ (2017: 272-278).   
 Although it is not our aim to argue for humour primitivism, one of Williamson’s tracts seems 
applicable to humour analysis. Correct philosophical analyses are rare and it seems that the burden 
of evidence is on the analysis advocate to indicate why her target phenomenon is likely to have one 
(Williamson 2000: 30). The burden is not discharged by noting some plausible necessary condition, 
(e.g. incongruity) and noting that its supplementations have yielded successively closer 
approximations to the target. Some properties, (e.g. scarlet) have necessary conditions (being 
coloured) which cannot be supplemented to yield a correct analysis. Further, some approximation-
series never converge upon their target. Examples include non-converging mathematical 
approximations, attempted analyses of parenthood in terms of ancestry relations (Williamson 2000: 
4, 30) or epicyclic approximations of planetary orbits. Williamson goes further, arguing that the 
repeated failure of putative analyses of a phenomenon provides inductive evidence against the 
assumption that success is pending (2000: 30). If our take on humour analyses is correct there would 
appear to be a parallel case for adopting some basicness thesis about humour.12  
 Williamson proceeds to develop an influential picture on which knowledge is not only a basic 
epistemological notion, but on which it is the primary epistemological notion, explaining, for 
example, evidence and norms of belief and assertion (2000: chs.9, 11).13 
 In the next section we present some humour primitivist theses. Our aims and doctrine do not 
transpose directly from those of Williamson and O’Brien. First, our aim is to present, rather than 
motivate our primitivist theses (see section 7). Second, O’Brien expresses her primitivist thesis as a 
relation between phenomena of certain classes. Williamson is more ecumenical about the relata (c.f. 
 
11 In light of correspondence, we omit O’Brien’s uniqueness condition on primacy.  
12 O’Brien’s arguments from multiple sources (2017: 275 ) and explanatory role (2017: 277-278) may also have analogues 
pertinent to humour primitivism.  
13 O’Brien argues against accepting action primacy (O’Brien 2017: 280-285). 
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Ichikawa and Jenkins 2017: 117-118). Our rendering is in terms of generic entities – properties. 
However, our doubts about (RMI) are significant here. Still, if R-properties and M-properties are 
distinct, we think that each reading of our theses will be of some interest to some reader. Third, for 
any property, there are many arbitrary ways of specifying comparands relative to which it is basic 
or prime. However, unlike knowledge or action, humour and humorous amusement lack a consensual 
categorial home. We implicate certain comparands, but expect that fecund alternatives are 
available. 
         
 
6. Humour Primitivism  
 
We have rejected extant attempts at analysing the occurrence conditions for the generic state of 
humorous amusement. Perhaps that state is basic relative to the properties those theories appeal 
to, even when combined with any other familiar mental properties.  
 
(BHT) Humorous amusement is basic relative to the properties cited in extant theories combined 
with familiar mental properties.   
 
(BHT) can be developed for any extant theory, but we think that the anti-incongruity version, (BHI) 
is the most interesting. (BHI) is still compatible with perceived incongruity serving as a necessary 
condition for humorous amusement. It denies that perceived incongruity supplemented by any 
familiar mental properties gives a (non-redundant) condition in a satisfactory analysis of humorous 
amusement.  
 Since each failed analysis of humour supposes some response-dependence thesis, one might 
wonder if such theses are untrue: 
 
(BHA) Humour is basic relative to meriting or disposing toward humorous amusement.  
 
(BHA) is compatible with humour-responses providing a Levinson-style reference-fixing 
connection to humour, thus permitting a corresponding a priori connection, but it lacks the 
metaphysical modal or explanatory implications of response-dependence theses (cf. Kripke 1980: 
140 144).    
 Criticisms of instrumentalist and response-dependence views about artistic value, we think, 
suggest an axiological basicness thesis about the value of humour relative to the mental states it 
affords (Sharpe 2000, Shelley and Watkins 2012): 
 
(BHE) The humour value of an object is basic relative to the value of experiential states it affords. 
 
We also think that our realist might positively resist reducing humour value to that of its 
consequences, or to other values:  
 





Call the conjunction of (BHT)-(BHV) the humour ‘basic package’. We think that the basic package 
is, for now, a live option and that it presents an interesting perspective on humour inquiry.  
 For one who accepts the basic package, trying to develop extant materials into a satisfactory 
analysis of humour would be irrational, but strands involved in that project might legitimately 
survive. The methods employed for the analytic aim might uncover useful facts about: individually 
necessary or individually sufficient conditions on humour; contingent universal generalisations; or 
reference-fixing supported a priori connections between humour and incongruity or humorous 
amusement (See also O’Brien 2017: 274-275.)  
 The basic package exposes fruitful avenues for humour research. First, (BHA) frees the inquiry 
from the psychologistic directions of inquiry driven by response-dependence theses. For example, 
from the perspective of BHA the popular hypothesis that, necessarily, funny objects lack features 
which dispose or merit negative emotions has only cursory motivation and requires re-examination. 
Second, some discussions intimate that humour is valuable merely as a means to hedonic, cognitive, 
epistemological, social or ethical ends (cf. Carroll 2014: ch.3, Levinson 2006: 398-399; Morreall 2009: 
ch.6). The humour basicness package, however, leans away from instrumentalism or 
consequentialism about humour value and toward the underexplored hypothesis that, 
independently of its axiological consequences,  humour is valuable in itself.   
 There are also humour primacy theses. Our first primacy thesis concerns incongruity accounts, 
but it can be extended to other theories.   
 
(PHI) Humorous amusement is explanatorily prior to humorous perceived incongruity and 
familiar mental properties.  
 
If extant incongruity accounts of humorous amusement fail, there is a philosophically interesting 
state of humorous perceived incongruity which is left unanalysed (cf. Carroll 2014: 48-49). Our 
schematic suggestion takes the humorousness to which those states respond as primitive and takes 
that, along with other ‘internal’ conditions, to distinguish the comedic minority of such states.      
 Our second primacy thesis takes humour to be prior to the state of humorous amusement, along 
with theoretical supplements posited by standard response-dependence accounts.  
 
(PHA) Humour is explanatorily prior to humorous amusement (combined with merit or 
appropriate subject/condition pairs).  
 
PHA flat-footedly gives a ‘categorical’ basis underlying funny objects’ disposition to amuse. It also 
allows one to understand normative notions of meriting a response, or of propriety conditions on 
those encountering humour phenomena in the familiar terms of veracity to the phenomena.  
 Sometimes, those criticizing instrumentalist views about artistic values suggest that an object’s 
value is primary relative to the value of experiential states its encounter affords (cf. Sharpe 2000: 
325). This might suggest a parallel primacy thesis about humour relative to humorous amusement:  
 
(PHE) An object’s humour value is explanatorily prior to the experiential value of the amusement 
states it affords. 
 
On this view, humour has value which is prior to the value of states of, for example, pleasure that it 
affords those encountering its instances. Those states may have value in their own right, but the 
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humour value of the object is not exhausted by them and grasping the humour of the object is one 
source of such states’ value.  
 Call the conjunction of (PHI)-(PHV) the humour ‘primacy package’. The primacy package 
shares in some of the benefits of the basic package. However, it also has humour and humour value 
in primary position over other humour phenomena and assigns them priority in determining 
norms for humorous amusement, humorous laughter and, perhaps for the practical justification for 





We do not endorse any form of primitivism presented here. We do, however, think that they are 
potentially fruitful additions to the pool of candidate answers to (Q). They might not find advocates, 
but they do exert legitimate pressure on extant accounts and motivating their rejection might help 
explicate and advance the conceptual, metaphysical and methodological assumptions of humour 
inquiries. Further, the comparison of each primitivist thesis with its foil provides a uniform 
yardstick for the evaluation of contemporary rivals, theories which are complex and otherwise 
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